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Low-skilled Jobs: The French Strategy
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Abstract:
Since  1995,  French  governments  implemented  a  specific  strategy  aiming  at  lowering 
unemployment or inactivity of so called unskilled workers, in fact of low wage workers. This 
strategy used two tools:  cuts in employers’ social contributions reduce companies’ costs for 
hiring low-wage workers; the Prime Pour l’Emploi, PPE, raises low-wage workers’ incomes, 
and increases the gap between wage and assistance benefits in order to increase incentives for 
low-wage workers to take a job. The paper provides a description of the situation of unskilled 
workers in France. It describes the history of measures lowering employers’ contributions on 
low wages, presents and discusses the studies that have tried to assess the impact of such 
measures on employment. These cuts cost approximately 18 billion euros in 2007. An average 
estimate of about 550,000 jobs created would have an  ex post cost  of 9 billion euro,  i.e. 
176,000  euros  per  created  job.  The  history  and  the  structure  of  the  PPE  are  presented. 
According to existing studies, the PPE would not have a significant effect on labour supply. 
Should it be concluded from it that there is not inactivity trap? Or, on the contrary, that the 
trap  is  very  deep?  The  current  debate  on  the  appropriateness  to  maintain  employers’ 
contribution and PPE or to reform them is addressed.    
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1. Introduction
France is the sixth country in the world in terms of GDP, but seems unable to tackle mass 
unemployment. The French unemployment rate rose from 2.8% to 10% from 1974 to 1986 
and declined below 9% only in 2000-2001 and since July 2006. Over the last thirty years, 
policies aiming at reducing the unemployment rate have been central in the French economic 
policy.
They have consisted in: 
– macroeconomic strategies to raise GDP growth (like in 1981),
– wage moderation (called in France: ‘competitive disinflation’), 
– public employment policies,
– subsidies in the market sector for some workers’ categories (the young, the long-term 
unemployed), 
– measures  to  reduce  labour  supply  (early  retirement,  allowance  for  non-working-
mothers, 35-hour working week), 
– reforms of unemployment benefits,
– reforms of labour law (like the CNE-Contrat Nouvelle Embauche).
The  French  governments  also  implemented  a  specific  strategy  aiming  at  lowering 
unemployment or inactivity of so called unskilled workers, in fact of low wage workers. This 
strategy used two tools: 
1) Cuts in employers’ social contributions reduce companies’ costs for hiring low-wage 
workers. 
2) The Prime Pour l’Emploi, PPE (working tax credit) raises low-wage workers’ incomes, 
and increases the gap between wage and assistance benefits in order to increase incentives 
for low-wage workers to take a job. 
As the government has a control over minimum wages (SMIC) and minimum income (RMI), 
it may use four instruments for three objectives: reducing the unskilled workers’ wage bill for 
companies, ensuring a purchasing power for unskilled workers, ensuring a purchasing power 
for people without job.
Nevertheless, this strategy suffers from some contradictions:
– Social  contributions’ cuts  are  costly  in  terms  of  public  finances  and  weaken  the 
funding of the Social Security System.
– Companies have an incentive to create specific jobs paid at the SMIC level,  i.e.  low 
wage jobs with no prospect in terms of individual careers. 
– These jobs bring downwards medium wages. 
– Part-time jobs financial incentives both for companies and workers lead to an increase 
in the number of part-time jobs and hence of poor workers. 
– Maintaining a significant gap between labour income and assistance benefits puts a 
downward pressure on the latter. 
The French system has high social security contributions and unemployment benefits, which 
means that a measure increasing employment can have ex post a relatively low cost in terms 
of public finances. But a number of effects need to be assessed precisely: windfall effects (the 
measures subsidizes jobs that would have been created anyway), trade-off effects (companies 
create subsidised jobs instead of non-subsidised ones), effects of microeconomic substitution 
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(the measure allows the development of low-wage firms at the expense of the other firms) and 
macroeconomic substitution (if the measure is financed by a rise in another tax). 
Section 2 provides a description of the situation of unskilled workers in France and of the 
reasons  behind the specific  strategy in  favour  of  unskilled work.  Section 3 describes  the 
history of measures lowering employers’ contributions on low wages, presents and discusses 
the studies that have tried to assess the impact of such measures on employment. The current 
debate on the appropriateness to maintain existing measures or to reform them is addressed. 
Section 4 does the same job for PPE.  
2. The case for an unskilled workers employment strategy 
The analyses and debates on the strategy of social security contributions cuts on low-wage 
employees mix three different concepts:
– Low-wage workers. Initially workers paid at the SMIC level were concerned. Then, in 
order to avoid low-wage traps, contributions cuts were extended to employees paid up to 1.3, 
then 1.6 times the SMIC. It is the concept effectively used.
– Non graduate workers, but they can take relatively skilled or well-paid jobs, because of 
their  experience  or  some  specific  qualities.  Conversely,  some  graduate  workers  may  be 
obliged to accept unskilled or low-wage jobs. 
–  Unskilled jobs.  Their definition varies according to studies. INSEE definition retains 
farm workers, unskilled industrial workers, watchman, services to households employees and 
employees in the retail trade sector (see Chardon, 2001).
Most French economists have advocated a specific strategy for unskilled low-wage workers 
employment2, for five reasons:
1) Unskilled workers face a specific unemployment issue: competition from low wage 
emerging countries, technical progress and capital/labour substitution lead unskilled jobs to 
disappear in industrial sectors and more and more often in some service sectors. The existence 
of a minimum wage prevents their wages from falling sufficiently. On the contrary, skilled 
employees are close to full employment. Higher GDP growth would be constrained by skilled 
workers shortage before a satisfactory level of global employment can be reached.    
However, the French situation as concerns unskilled workers is not particularly bad relative to 
major OECD countries. If we consider employment rates according to education levels (see 
Tables 1 and 2): 
– In  1994:  France  was ranking  6 over  the  13 major  OECD countries.  So,  the  non-
employment of unskilled workers was not particularly bad in France already in 1994
– In  2004:  France  ranked  3  behind  Japan  and  Sweden.  Perhaps  because  of  policy 
measures, France ranks among the less ‘bad’ performers today. 
1. Activity and unemployment rates by educational attainment, 2004 
Less than upper 
secondary education 
Upper secondary 
education 
Tertiary education
US 63.1/10.5 77.6/ 5.6 84.7/3.3
Germany 61.1/20.5 78.2/11.2 87.5/5.5
France 67.8/12.1 81.5/7.6 87.1/6.2
2 For  instance,  CGP (1993);  Maarek  (2004);  Drèze,  Malinvaud  et  alii  (1994); de  Foucauld (1994) ; 
Sneessens et Shadman-Mehta (1995); Laffargue (1996 et 1997); Pisani (2000).
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UK 56.8/6.6 82.4/3.7 89.6/2.2
Sweden 71.6/6.5 85.7/5.8 92.2/2.8
European Union 15 63.1/9.0 79.8/6.2 88.1/4.3
Source: OECD (2006), Employment Outlook.
2 Difference between employment ratios for tertiary education and less than upper 
secondary education
1994 2004
Japan n.a. 12.5
US 34.0 25.5
Germany 34.4 34.1
Austria 32.8 30.3
Belgium 34.0 34.7
Denmark 28.4 24.5
Spain 28.5 23.7
Finland 28.3 27.5
France 29.4 22.1
Italy 32.7 30.7
Netherlands 30.6 25.5
UK 30.3 33.8
Sweden 10.6 18.4
Source: OECD (2006), Employment Outlook.
The education level of the population, especially for the young, is on a rising trend while 
some young graduate people are unemployed or take a job requesting a lower educational 
attainment (see Nauze-Fichet and Tomasini, 2002). According to “employment surveys” of 
INSEE, the share of graduates among unskilled workers rose from 2% in 1982, to 8% in 1992 
and 21% in 2004. So, educational levels may be a reason for disparities in unemployment 
rates. In a mass unemployment situation, graduate workers apply for jobs for which they are 
over-skilled.  Having the choice,  companies  will  hire  them in priority,  the education level 
giving a signal of ability to work and non-graduate people will not find jobs. In this context, 
the priority is not to increase unskilled labour supply. On the contrary, it would be necessary 
to increase employment at all levels of the hierarchy, which will make jobs available for the 
unskilled. A tighter labour market would lead employers to be less demanding when hiring 
people. 
2) The high levels of the minimum wage (SMIC) and minimum income (RMI) would be a 
major reason for French unemployment, because it would maintain unskilled workers’ wages 
at an excessive level. Many unskilled workers would have a labour productivity at below the 
SMIC costs including social contributions, and could be hired only at below the minimum 
wage.  Cuts  in  employers’ social  contributions  at  average  or  higher  wages  could possibly 
generate increases in gross wages.  But since the SMIC is  controlled,  a cut in employers’ 
contributions translates necessarily in lower wage costs at that level. 
This strategy of contributions employers’ cuts is equivalent to that recommended by liberals: 
the market would cause wage levels to fall but their impact on employees’ living standards 
could be possibly offset by a negative tax. This is more socially acceptable since unskilled 
workers do not see a fall in their wages and do not have the impression they live basically on 
welfare transfers. 
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Social contributions exemptions offset the relatively high level of minimum wages in France: 
in 2005, the SMIC was roughly half the average wage; 16% of workers earned the SMIC (see 
Table 3).
3. Minimum wages in Europe and in the US 
In Euros, in 2005
% employees at the 
minimum wage level, 
2004
% average workers’ wage 
2005
Luxembourg 1467 18.0 43.5
Netherlands 1265 2.1 40.2
Belgium 1210 n.a. 39.9
UK 1197 1.4 50.3
France 1197 15.6 47.5
Ireland 1183 3.1 44.8
Greece 668 n.a. 43.8
US 666 1.4 25.2
Spain 599 0.8 29.8
Czech republic 240 2.0 38.7
Hungary 232 8.0 38.9
Poland 205 4.5 33.0
Source : Eurostat.
According to the mainstream theoretical view, an un-employed worker is less productive than 
those who work. Falls in labour costs allow some unemployed people to become employable. 
The  impact  depends  on  skills  distribution.  However,  the  concept  of  workers’ individual 
productivity can be criticised: do unskilled workers have a productivity in value independent 
of wages level? But why is an unskilled worker paid more in France than in India? According 
to another view, the productivity in value is social and historical; unskilled workers benefit 
from technical progress made in the whole economy; there are a large number of relatively 
similar  unskilled  workers;  their  employment  is  constrained  by  labour  demand  from 
companies; the impact of lower labour costs depends on the elasticity of labour demand to its 
cost. 
3) A targeted measure is more efficient than a global measure in terms of job creation to 
budget costs ratios. It is less costly to create low wage jobs than higher wage jobs. This higher 
efficiency is amplified if demand for unskilled work is more sensitive to wage costs than 
demand for skilled work. 
4) Lowering the cost of unskilled jobs would allow to create jobs in the services to people 
sector (domestic care, shops, hotels-cafes-restaurants) that are currently underdeveloped in 
France due to the excessive cost of unskilled work. 
5) Because of the minimum income (RMI), the gap between wage and insurance benefits 
incomes  is  very  small  for  unskilled  workers,  especially  when  only  part-time  jobs  are 
available. Thus, unskilled workers can fall into an “inactivity trap”. 
So, in the last 10 years, three view points have been opposed in France: 
– Keynesian:  unemployment  results  mainly  from  insufficient  demand.  For  a  given 
demand level,  fall in labour costs may be an incentive for companies to use more 
labour. 
– Classical:  unemployment  results  from  insufficient  flexibility  in  the  French  labour 
market; unemployment benefits should be reduced; wage and employment legislation 
should be made more flexible
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– ‘Socio-liberal’: unskilled labour costs should be reduced, via a) social contributions’ 
cuts since the SMIC purchasing power cannot be reduced and b) a working tax credit 
(PPE) increasing work incentives.   
Social contributions’ cuts aim at reducing the high level of employers’ social contributions in 
France.  In  2004,  employers’ social  contributions  amounted to  11% of  GDP in France,  in 
comparison to 7.3% at the EU-15 level; wage taxes amounted to 1.1% (0.3% at the EU-15 
level). But employees’ contributions were amounting only to 4% of GDP in France, similar to 
the EU-15 level (3.9%).
 At the average wage level, social contributions (incl. CSG-CRDS) amount to more than 65 
percentage point for a gross wage of 100: the employer pays 144, the worker gets 79. There is 
a  wide gap between labour  costs  paid by  the  company (144)  and  labour  income for  the 
employee (44, accounting for the fact that unemployment allowances amount on average to 
35)
4. Social contributions rates, January 2006, gross wage = 100
Employer Employee
CSG-CRDS (8%*97%) 7.76
Social security :
• Maternity-sickness 12.80 0.75
• Old age (under ceiling) 9.90 6.75
      Old age (above ceiling) 1.60 0.0
• Family 5.40
Injuries at work (average rate) 2.30
Complementary pension (under ceiling) 5.70 3.80
Complementary pension (over ceiling) 13.90 8.60
Unemployment
Incapacity
4.39
0.30
2.44
Other 3.05
Total 43.84
43.74
21.50
19.55
Wage costs and net wages 143.84 78.50
143.74 80.45
The financing by contributions is socially and economically logic for all replacement benefits 
(unemployment, old age, sickness allowances) which are differed wages and which, according 
to the  principle  of  the Social  Security,  depend on contributions  paid.  On the other  hand, 
family and health benefits, which are now universal in France, should not be financed by 
contributions  on  activity  incomes  but  by  general  taxes.  The  operation  was  done  for  the 
employees contributions by the creation of the CSG; remain to be done for the 18,2 points of 
employers contributions,  family and health.  
Three strategies may be implemented and have been discussed in France since 1975 (see 
Sterdyniak and Villa, 1998).
a) A gradual substitution of employers’ contributions by CSG points so that a single tax is 
levied on households to finance all universal benefits, which would be socially logical. But 
this would mean to increase gradually the CSG by 11 points. This would represent a transfer 
from households to companies which is not desirable since companies’ financial situation has 
been satisfactory since 1987 (the reform should have been implemented between 1975 and 
1985). Offsetting measures would be needed, like gross wages’ increases: in this case, the 
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measure could be neutral for firms and could support employees at the expense of pensioners 
and  capital  incomes  holders.  But  it  is  difficult  to  reduce  further  the  relative  income  of 
pensioners. Measures would be needed to compensate pensioners’ incomes losses and then the 
measure would be almost neutral. 
b)  Some politicians  and  economists  have  suggested  the  introduction  of  a social VAT 
replacing  employers’ contributions.  The  idea  is  that  this  social  VAT would not  weigh on 
labour income but on imports; this would make it possible to have our social protection paid 
by foreign producers. This is a mistake from an economic point of view. Since the VAT does 
not weigh on capital goods, such a substitution would not reduce the relative cost of labour 
compared to capital and would not support labour-intensive sectors. The VAT is levied on 
imports  and  is  refunded  on  exports,  contrary  to  social  security  contributions.  So  such  a 
substitution  would  give  some  competitiveness  gains  to  French  firms  like  currency 
devaluation. But these gains would materialise only if the increase in the prices of imported 
consumer goods, resulting from the rise in VAT, did not have any impact on wages, in other 
words if employees accepted a fall of their purchasing power. Of workers obtained the rise of 
the wages necessary to compensate for this loss, the spiral price-wages would continue until 
the rise of the prices made disappeared the competitiveness gains.  This is  not tax reform 
miracle  which  provides  competitiveness  gains  without  loss  of  purchasing  power  of  the 
workers. 
c) A few economists have suggested a tax on firms’ value added (like in Italy with IRAP) 
bearing also on exports and investment. This reform would support labour-intensive sectors 
and would be an incentive for companies to use more labour and less capital, but the French 
government refused it. The fear of the government was that the introduction of a new tax on 
profits would generate excessive transfers between companies, harm the capital intensive and 
supposed to be more innovative sectors induce capital moving abroad The situation is thus 
blocked. Governments unable to lower all employers’ contributions concentrate on falls in 
low wages. 
3. Social contributions cuts on low wages
3.1 A history
The French social protection system was initially a Bismarkian one: social protection is linked 
with  employment.  Traditionally,  benefits  were  entitled  only  to  salaries  and  funded  by 
employers and employees contributions, with a ceiling (which is nearly twice the average 
wage).  This  system evolved  in  different  ways  depending  on  benefits.  Family  and  health 
benefits  have  become  universal.  As  concerns  unemployment,  a  system  of  benefits  and 
contributions was set up for the part of wages ranging from 1 to 4 ceilings. For retirement 
pensions, a supplementary system was introduced to cover on the one hand the part of wages 
under the ceiling; on the other hand, the part of wages beyond the ceiling.
The ceiling on health contributions was progressively dismantled between 1967 and 1984, 
and the ceiling on family contributions was abolished in 1989. This allowed to limit between 
1980 and 1993 the rise in the rate of employers’ social contributions to the part of wages 
below the ceiling (which increased from 36.3% to 36.6%) while making the effort bear on the 
part of wages above the ceiling (at a rate increasing from 13.7% to 34.9%).
Social contributions’ cuts on low wages have been progressively implemented since July 1993 
(see Table 5 and chart 1), with the explicit aim view to reduce capital/labour substitution and 
foreign relocation, to support labour intensive firms and the “services to persons” sector.
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Cuts applied first to family contributions (5.4 percentage points from 1993 to 1995); then to 
health  contributions  (from  1995  to  1997).  Starting  from  June  1996,  specific  social 
contributions  exemptions  were  introduced  for  companies  implementing  working-time 
reduction while creating jobs (Loi Robien, June 1996,  Loi Aubry 1, June 1998). In January 
2000,  all  companies  having  signed  an  agreement  on  the  35-hour  week  were  given 
contributions’ exemptions. The objective was to compensate partly for the rises in wage costs 
resulting from lower working time. From 2003, the exemption was no more linked to the 35-
hour working week: it became ‘unique’ and decreasing between 1 to 1.7 (and later 1.6 SMIC). 
In 2005, the measure was benefiting 10.5 million employees. 
Two  obstacles  will  make  the  assessment  of  the  impact  of  the  cuts  difficult.  First,  the 
contributions’ cuts have been modified over time; they are still criticised which means that 
companies  may  doubt  about  the  permanence  of  the  measures.  Second,  it  is  difficult  to 
disentangle the impacts of the 35 hour working week and the employers’ contributions cuts in 
the 1998-2003 period. The increase in part time jobs may also disturb the analysis. 
5. Social contributions cuts on low wages
Time Period Measures Cuts  at 
SMIC level
From 1/07/93 to  31/12/94 Abolition  of  family  contributions  between  1  and  1.1  SMIC.
50% cut, up to 1.2 SMIC.
5.4%
From 1/1/95 to 31/8/95 Abolition  of  family  contributions  between  1  to  1.2  SMIC.   
50% cut, up to 1.3 SMIC.
5.4%
From 1/9/95 to 30/6/96 Abolition  of  family  contributions  between  1  to  1.2  SMIC.   
50% up to 1.3 SMIC
+ Rebate on health contributions: 800FF per month at the SMIC 
level, decreasing until 1.33 SMIC. 
18.2%
From 1/10/96 to 31/12/97 Decreasing single rebate from 1 to 1.33 SMIC 18.2%
From 1/1/97 to 31/12/02 Decreasing single rebate from 1 to 1.3 SMIC 18.2%
From 1/1/00 to 21/12/02 For “35 hour” firms, decreasing rebate:  from 21 500 FF per year 
at SMIC level to 4000 FF from 1.8 SMIC
26%
From 01/01/03 to 1/1/05 Progressive transition to a decreasing single rebate between 1 and 
1.7 SMIC 
26%
From 1/7/05 Rebate from 1 to 1.6 SMIC 26%
Chart 1: Employers Social Contributions cuts (in point)
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In 2006, contributions’ cuts decrease with wages: from 26% of monthly gross wage at the 
SMIC level to 0% for 1.6 SMIC, according to the formula: 
(0.26/0.6) x {1.6 x [(smic x hours worked)/monthly gross wage] – 1}
where smic is the hourly minimum wage rate, i.e. 8.27 euros.
The cut is maximal at the SMIC level: it amounts to 326 euros for a gross wage of 1254 euros. 
Then, the cut decreases (within 1 and 1.6 SMIC): for a 1 euro rise in the wage, the cut is 
reduced by 43 cents. The progressiveness of the measure has the disadvantage of making very 
expensive wage rises at SMIC level a 10% wage rise for a worker at the SMIC level (+ 125 
euros)  costs  271 euros  to  the employer  and increases  by 22 euros  the worker  take-home 
income (accounting for the PPE, house benefits, income tax).
Other measures of a smaller size apply to specific groups of people (the young, the long-term 
unemployed), to certain geographical areas and finally to domestic services. On the whole, 
contributions cuts amounted to 23.6 billion euro in 2006 (3.3% of wage costs).
6. Contributions’ cuts in 2006
Total Reimbursed by the State Non-Reimbursed
Low wages 18.2 18.2
Specific groups 2.3 1.4 0.9
Specific areas 1.3 1.3
Domestic services 1.7 0.3 1.4
Total 23.6 21.3 2.3
7. Evolution of general contribution cuts (in billion euros)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 200
4
200
5
2006
0.6 1.8 3.0 5.9 6.9 6.3 6.9 11.0 13.2 14.2 15.0 15.8 16.4 17.8
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3.2 SMIC and average wage
Contributions’ cuts on low wages will be an incentive for low skilled jobs at the condition that 
cuts effectively reduce labour costs and do not generate a rise in the SMIC. Since 1993, the 
SMIC increased more rapidly than average wages (0.5% per year on average). The total effect 
can  be  estimated  at  6.5%.  This  rise  comes  from  rises  in  the  SMIC  at  the  time  of  the 
implementation of the 35 hour-working week.
8. Rises in the SMIC and average wages (hourly) 
SMIC Average wage Prices
1994 2.1 2.0 1.6
1995 4.0 2.4 1.8
1996 2.5 2.6 2.0
1997 4.0 2.7 1.2
1998 2.0 2.1 0.7
1999 1.2 1.9 0.5
2000 3.2 5.2 1.7
2001 4.0 4.2 1.4
2002 2.4 3.6 2.0
2003 5.3 2.8 2.1
2004 5.9 2.9 2.1
2005 5.5 3.0 1.8
2006 3.0 3.1 1.9
Purchasing power 1.85 1.35
3.3 Social contributions’ cuts on low wages: what does empirical research say?
A large variety of analyses have addressed the economic impact of social contributions’ cuts. 
Employers’ social contributions cut’s play through 7 channels: 
– Substitution effects at the company level: each company has an incentive to use more 
unskilled work and less skilled work and capital for a given level of output. 
– Substitution effects between firms and sectors: firms or sectors with many low wages 
have an advantage as compared to the others. 
– In these two cases, there is a priori no positive impact on output. There is a positive 
impact if unskilled labour is in a situation of under-employment while skilled labour is 
at full employment. Skilled workers wages will increase, which will reduce the impact 
of the measure.
– If the market for unskilled workers is in a situation of classical equilibrium, then cuts 
in real wages will make it pay to hire unskilled workers. This will allow for a rise in 
output and hence for hiring more skilled workers. 
– The reduction in costs allows companies to cut their selling prices, which leads output 
to rise. But this will occur only if the social contributions cuts are not financed through 
the rise in another tax. 
– Some studies find that the employer cut has such a high effect that it is self-financing. 
Other studies find that the effect is weaker so that some public deficit remains. The 
impact of the measure depends also of the impact of the taxes which are supposed to 
be increased to equilibrate the public balance. These are often social contributions on 
high-wage workers, which may reduce their employment or their wages. 
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Unskilled jobs will increase in any case, but skilled jobs will either decrease or increase. 
Boxes 1 to 3 give some examples of simple models used to justify the cut. The first one is 
based on the assumption that the employment/wage elasticity is higher for low wages than for 
higher wages. The second model assumes also that wages are more rigid at low-wage levels. 
The third shows that firms may be the winners of the cut.
Four  arguments  against  the  progressiveness  of  social  contributions  can  be  found  in  the 
literature:
– The measure is costly because it generates windfall effects either to companies that would 
anyway hire unskilled workers or to theses workers themselves if they see a rise in their 
wages. The cost would bear on skilled workers who would see a fall in their number of jobs. 
On the whole, the impact on employment and on output could be negative. But this is true 
only if the measure has a low efficiency and if skilled employment is very sensitive to wages.
–  The  measure  would  deteriorate  the  quality  of  available  jobs  in  rising  the  number  of 
unskilled jobs  at  the  expense of  skilled  jobs  and this  would be  detrimental  to  long-term 
growth (Garnier and Nys, 1996)
–  The  measure  would  be  a  disincentive  for  unskilled  workers  to  acquire  skills  through 
vocational training, which would reduce potential output (Oskamp and Snower, 2006). But a 
rising  unskilled  unemployment  and  increasing  wage  inequalities  are  a  priori a  strong 
incentive for employees or the young to get skilled. It may also be thought that the unskilled 
acquire skills more easily when they have a job than if they remain unemployed. 
– Windfall effects would be smaller if the measure focused on the unskilled who really cannot 
take a job. This means that the unskilled are a heterogeneous group. For instance, Brown et 
al. (2006) have suggested restricting subsidies to the long-term unemployed and unskilled. 
But this measure has a much smaller scope. The incentive for companies to create unskilled 
jobs may disappear and instead companies would hire long-term unemployed workers: the 
unemployment rate would not be lowered, but would affect different groups of workers. 
3.3.1 Some statistical facts
The ratio of unskilled jobs to total employment was 28% in 1982, decreased to 23% in 1992 
and has remained roughly stable since the introduction of social contributions’ cuts on low 
wages: 24% in 2002. 
This may suggest that contributions’ cuts allowed for maintaining a number of unskilled jobs, 
amounting to 4% of total employment (580 000 jobs). But it may also suggest that companies 
created unskilled instead of skilled jobs. 
Contributions’ cuts benefit mainly small companies. The apparent cut to wage costs is 5.9% 
for companies with less than 10 employees; 4% for companies with 50 to 99 employees; 3.1% 
for  companies  with  250  to  499  employees,  1.3%  for  companies  with  more  than  500 
employees. 
The apparent ratio is 4.6 % on average, but 11% for hotels-restaurants, 9.8% for retail trade, 
8.3% in services to companies.
Kramarz and Philippon (2001) use “Labour Force survey” microeconomic data. They find 
that an increase in minimum wage costs increases slightly the probability of being fired for 
minimum wage workers, but that tax subsidies do not have significant effect on entry from 
non-employment.
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BOX 1: A first simple model
Let us consider the impact of employers’ contributions cuts in a simple model. Contributions 
cuts are 26 percentage points at the SMIC level and decrease in a linear way until they become 
nil at 1.6 times SMIC. The cuts apply to all employees in the private sector, i.e. 14.5 million in 
full-time equivalent. 10 categories of employees are considered, depending on wage levels. Let 
us assume that employment/wage elasticity vary from 1.0 at lower wages to 0.2 at higher wages 
and that there is a substitution elasticity between employees’ categories, with an elasticity of 0.2 
for two adjoining groups. Gross wages are assumed to be fixed.
The current measure would cost on average 1500 euros per employee in FTE (125 euros per 
month); 21.75 billions euros. It would have created 626 400 jobs (4.3%), i.e 34 720 euro per 
job. Accounting for employers’ contributions (rate: 42%), employees’ contributions (rate: 21%), 
and employment benefits (rate: 31%), these jobs would bring 8,69 billion euros in terms of 
Social Security funding. The net cost of the measure would then be: 13.06 billion euros, i.e. 20 
849 euros per job. Under the same assumption, job creation at the SMIC level initiated by the 
cut has a cost of 21370 euros ex ante, but 6621 euros ex post. The measure remains costly. To 
equilibrate the financial effect of the measure, all social contribution rates can be risen by 4 
percentage points; the measure will increase employment only by 3.4% (493 000 people) and 
the GDP by 1.7%.
9. Impact of contributions’ cuts in 2006
Without financing… With financing..
Deciles/emplo
yment-wage 
elasticity
Gross 
monthly wage, 
in Euros
Cut, in % of 
labour cost In Euros
Employment 
effect 
Cut, in % of 
the labour 
cost
Employment 
effect
d1/1,0
d2/0,8
d3/0,6
d4/0,5
d5/0,4
d6/0,2
d7/0,2
d8/0,2
d9/0,2
d10/0,2
15 000
16 200
18 200
20 000
22 200
24 700
27 950
33 000
41 500
74 000
18
16
12
9
5
0
0
0
0
0
3 900
3 750
3 150
2 600
1 600
0
0
0
0
0
18.7
13.4
7.1
4.8
0.2
– 1.0
15.5
13.4
9.0
6.3
2.0
–2.8
–2.8
–2.8
–2.8
–2.8
16.5
11.0
5.0
3.0
1.5
–0.7
–0.55
–0.55
–0.55
–0.55
29 175 1 500 + 4.3 % +3.4%
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BOX 2: Social contributions on low-skilled and skilled workers
Let us consider a world with two kinds of workers, the low-skilled L, and the skilled, S. The 
production function exhibits constant scale according to labour. The wage of L workers is k the 
average wage, when L employment is  % of global employment. The wage bill received by L 
workers is then   k % of global wage bill. The model is: 
– wage formation  :  l l lw nµ= s s sw nµ=
– substitution :          ( )s l l l s sn n w t w tσ= + + − −
– ex ante budgetary constraint  : (1 ) 0l skt k tα α+ − =
We consider a contribution cut on L wages of 1 percentage point of GDP; which means that 
lt  decreases by 1/ kδα  %, whereδ  is the wage share in GDP. We first make the assumption 
that this cut is offset by a rise in social contributions on S workers. 
In a keynesian regime, output is determined by demand, so: (1 ) 0l skn k nα α+ − =  
Employment varies according to: 
( )
1 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )s l
kn
k k k k
σ δ α α σµ α σµ
−
=
− + + − +
The effect is positive as soon as k>1.  Let us take 0.6 0.3 0.7 1k a δ σ= = = =  
With rigid wages, 0l sµ µ= = , the effect is : 1.16%n =  with 7.94%ln =  1.74%sn = −
If skilled workers wages increase with their employment, 1Sµ = , the effect is  0.98%n = with 
6.73%nn =  0.85%qn = − .  The effect is weaker as the fall in S wages decreases ex post the 
substitution effects.  
In a classical regime, companies set their price as: ( ) ( ) ( )1 0l l s sk w t k w tα α+ + − + =
The effect of a funding measure is: 
( )
( )
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
s l
s n l s
k k
n
k k ak k
σ α µ α µ
δ α σµ µ α σµ σµ
− − −
=
− + + − +
with 1qµ = , 0nµ = , the impact is  2.90%n =  avec 9.68%nn =  0%qn =  1.74%y =
The effect is higher than in a Keynesian regime because the fall in unskilled labour rises 
output.
In the classical regime, let us consider a fall in social contributions on L wages, without 
compensation. The effects are: 
(1 )s ls
kn t
k
α
µ α
−
= −
−
 and (1 )
s
l l
s
kn t
k
α σµ
µ α
+
= −
−
   So, 0.22q nn t= −  ; 1.44n nn t= −  ; 0.43 ny t=
The impact on public finances can then be positive due to social contribution on new workers 
and decreases in unemployment benefits.  
10% cut of low-skilled labour cost
Initial situation Final situation 
L wage (including contribution) 0.6 0.54
L employment 30 34.32 
S wage (including contribution) 1.17 1.20
S employment 70 71.54
Output 100 104.3
Social contributions 28.6 28.1
Unemployment benefit – 0.9
Public balance 0.4
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BOX 3: A third simple model
Let us consider that the economy is classical unemployment situation: companies’ output is not 
constrained by demand but by the real wage level. 
In order to cut the wage bill by 10%, the government cuts the employees social contribution rate 
down from 42 to 28. This leads companies to increase the number of their workers by  * 10 %, 
where  is the elasticity of employment to cost. Companies benefit  from a windfall  on the 
workers they would have hired anyway. The total cost for public finances is 14- 9.8 The cut 
will have a positive impact on public finances as soon as  is higher than 1.4. The cut must be 
financed otherwise. Table 10 shows also that the cut benefits mainly to firms, but this result 
comes partly from the assumption that wages are rigid.
10. Impact of employers’ social contributions cuts in a situation of classical unemployment
tCSE = 42 % tCSE = 28 %
Employment/wage elasticity: 0 0,6 1 1,5
Output
Employment 
159
100
159
100
168.5
106
174.2
110
181.8
115
VAT 17 17 18 18.6 19.4
Gross wages 100 100 106 110 115
Employers’ social contributions 42 28 29.7 30.8 32.2
Employees’ social contributions 21 21 22.3 23.1 24.1
Unemployment benefits* – 2.1 – 3.5 – 5.2
Households’ incomes 0 + 2.6 + 4.4 + 6 .7
Companies profit + 14 + 14.8 + 14.8 + 15.2
Government budget – 14 – 7.9 – 4.0 + 0.9
*Unemployment benefits assumed to be on average 35% of gross wages.
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3.3.2. A comparison of empirical studies on the impact of social contribution cuts
We will distinguish the ex ante modelling, the ex ante and ex post microeconometric analysis, 
the ex post macroeconometric studies.  
The ex ante modelling 
The CSERC’s study (1996) supposes that the is higher for low wages than for higher wages 
(from 0.7 to 0.3). There exists moreover a substitution between workers of different level 
wages.  These  elasticities  are  not  postulated.  The  Dares  study  (1997)  postulates  that  the 
employment/wage elasticity is 0,6 on the level of the unskilled workers. 
Malinvaud  (1997)  builds  an  analytical  model.  The  market  of  the  unskilled  workers  is 
supposed  in  disequilibrium  due  to  a  too  strong  level  of  the  minimal  wage.  The 
employment/wage elasticity is supposed 1.2 at the SMIC level. But, the channels are hardly 
clarified. The cut in place in 1997 should allow the creation of 350.000 jobs in 10 years, of 
500.000 jobs in the long run. 
Laffargue (1996 and 2000) built a Computable  General Equilibrium Model  (CGEM) with 
three factors of production: the unskilled labour (whose real wages are rigid), skilled labour 
and  capital.  Skilled  labour  work  and  capital  are  complementary;  unskilled  work  is 
substitutable (with an elasticity of substitution of 2.5). With this value, the model predict the 
creation of 560,000 unskilled employments and the destruction of 32.000 skilled employment 
for a reduction of 10 point of the contributions employers on unskilled labour. 
Salanié (2000) as Auric and al. (2000) build a model, which supposes the market of unskilled 
workers is in classical unemployment (due to the SMIC level) when the skilled labour is in 
equilibrium  (by  wages  adjustment).  Unskilled  worker  accounts  for  16%  of  the  working 
population. Capital and skilled labour are complementary and their aggregate is substitutable 
with  unskilled  work,  with  an  elasticity  of  substitution  of  0.7.  A cut  of  10  points  of  the 
employers social contributions on unskilled workers allows the creation of 120.000 jobs and a 
rise of the production (0.3%), which strongly reduces the ex post cost of the measure. But, the 
functioning of their CGEM is not confronted with the facts. Can we explain the evolution of 
un-skilled jobs only by the real minimum wage, without impact of demand conditions? Does 
unemployment only strike unskilled people? 
L’Horty (2000) built a similar model with skilled and unskilled worker, with an elasticity of 
substitution of 1 between these two types of workers.
Doisy and al. (2004) build a calibrated CGEM which has the specificity to differentiate three 
types of workers:  unskilled (paid at  the SMIC level,  18% of the workforce),  the insiders 
(which negotiate their wages, 48% of the workforce) and the upper-skilled (of which wages 
balances  their  market,  34% of  the workforce).The  cut  in  place  in  rebate  of  1997 creates 
318.000 jobs in 2000 : 176.000 unskilled workers and 143.000 insiders, the GDP increases by 
1,5%, the wages of the insiders by 0,3%, the wages of upper-skilled by 2%. The ex post cost 
of the measure is only 15% of the ex ante cost because of the rise of wages, and then of soial 
contributions. 
Giuliani (2005) built a calibrated CGEM, where unskilled worker accounts for 61% of the 
working population. The results strongly depend on the values of the parameters. The number 
of jobs created by the cuts in place irn 2005 goes from 3.775.000 to 250.000. In the central 
scenario, the figure is 575.000, with a rise of 3.6% of unskilled employment, of 0.3% of 
skilled employment and a rise of 1.1% of the GDP. 
These works is based on calibrated models. Parameters are not estimated. The functioning of 
the French economy is postulated: the demand for unskilled labour is constrained by the level 
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of the SMIC. Skilled workers are at full employment, due to wage adjustment. So the measure 
increases unskilled employment, with no impact on skilled ones. 
An ex ante microeconometric analysis
Laroque and Salanié (2000) use a microeconomic simulation model. They assume that wages 
are equal to marginal labour productivity, itself depending on the worker’s characteristics. 
The employers’ contributions cut as in place in 1997 has two consequences: people with a 
productivity standing between 87% of the SMIC and the SMIC become employable; workers 
paid at  1 to 1.33 SMIC benefit  from a wage rise (companies refund them the employers 
contributions cuts to them) from 14.7% to 0. 
The authors estimate that 430 000 people are in the first category of recipients (all workers 
with wages within the SMIC and 1.33 SMIC). In addition, the wage rises resulting from the 
contributions’ cuts would have attracted 60.000 people on the labour market. The effect of the 
1997 cut is thus of 490.000 jobs.
This model lacks realism (Sterdyniak, 2000): firms did not increase wages at the SMIC level 
by 14.7%; a 5% rise in the SMIC does not lead people with wages between 1 and 1.05 times 
SMIC to be fired: firms always need cashiers and shopkeepers. The concept of individual 
productivity does not have any meaning: if a shop needs a cashier, it will have to pay a wage 
of 1000 euros a month (if the SMIC is 1000 euros); 1100 (if the SMIC is 1100 euros) even if 
on the whole the increase of the SMIC may induce some losses of unskilled jobs. Last, the 
estimate cannot be precise: the unskilled unemployed have roughly the same characteristics as 
the  unskilled  employed.  Does  this  mean  that  a  small  decrease  in  wage  costs  would  be 
sufficient to have them offered a job? Or that the problem lies in an insufficient number of 
available jobs?  
An ex post microeconometric analysis
Crépon and Desplatz (2001) make microeconometric comparison of companies’ behaviours 
depending on the benefit provided by contribution cuts implemented between 1995 and 1997. 
They conclude that these cuts would have created 460,000 jobs. 
Cuts would have played without delay, contrary to one could expect, but the authors claim 
that cuts would have in fact slowed down jobs destruction. 
However, the results can be questioned (Sterdyniak, 2002): 
– the rise in employment results from a big rise in output and a strong fall in prices and 
not from substitution effects; 
– Almost as many skilled (220,000) as unskilled jobs would have been created; 
– The  micro-macro  transition  rough:  460,000  jobs  are  the  difference  between  the 
number of jobs created by firms having benefited from the cuts and the number of jobs 
created  by  firms  that  did  not  benefit  from the  cuts.  However,  the  latter  group of 
companies must have suffered from the cuts if they translated in lower prices in the 
firms benefiting from the cuts. 
– The  authors  estimate  that  the  measure  increased  GDP by  0.65%  per  annum  and 
employment by 0.7% between 1994 and 1997. In that period, GDP rose by 2.05% per 
annum in the EU-12 and by 1.55% in France. According to the authors, French GDP 
would have grown by a mere 0.9% in the absence of this cut, which does not seem 
very credible.
Macroeconometrique ex post analysis
Beffy and Fourcade (2004) estimates that the cuts  of employers contributions in place in 
2002 led to a relative fall of 8,3% of the cost of unskilled labour compared to that of skilled 
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one. They estimate an equation of employment where the elasticity of employment at its cost 
is 0.22%, but where the elasticity of employment to the relative cost unskilled/skilled workers 
is 0.37. 
(26,5) (3,2) (3,0)
(4,2) (4,9)
log( ) log( ) 1.8 0.005* 0,001* * 92 3 0,22*log( / )
0,37*log( ) 0,6*US S
employement PIB time time dum Q w p
w w workingtime
− = − − + −
− − −
Thus  the  cut  would  have  induced  the  creation  of  0.37*  86.5*14.5  millions=330  000 
employment in 2000 (and of 450.000 in 2002). The equation takes into account the specificity 
of a cut centred on the low-wages; it is badly specified since intervenes the labour cost and 
not  the  capital  relative  cost  capital/labour;  finally,  the   labour  productivity  gains  are 
represented by a trend, with a rupture in 92-Q3. 
Hennion and Loisy (2006) evaluate that the social contributions cuts in 2003 involve a fall of 
1.95% of the labour cost. From an estimation of an employment equation, they evaluate that 
the elasticity of total employment at its cost is 0.9.
(2,0) (3,3) (2,8)
log( ) log( ) 1.8 0.002* 0.9*log( / ) 0.03*employment GDP time w p RED− = − − − +
where RED is the working-time reduction.
Thus  the  cut  would  have  induced  the  creation  of  0.9*  1.95*14.5  millions=250  000 
employments.  But,  the  equation  does  not  take  into  account  the  specificity  of  a  measure 
centred on the low-wages; it is badly specified since intervenes the labour cost and not the 
capital  relative  cost  capital/labour;  finally,  autonomous  labour  productivity  gains  are 
represented by a trend, whereas the division between technical progress and real wage effects 
is difficult to establish. 
Gafsi et al. (2004) use information at industry level. The production function combines three 
factors:  skilled  labour,  unskilled  labour,  capital.  Skilled  and  unskilled  labour  appear 
substitutable,  with  an  elasticity  of  2.  Wages  are  endogenous.  Unfortunately,  the  authors 
suppose that workers consider social security contributions as differed wages and so they 
claim  for  wage  increases  to  compensate  for  the  falls  in  employers’ contributions.  But, 
obviously, this mechanism does not play for compensated cuts, without impact on benefits. 
On the whole, the 1999 cut would have created 118,000 unskilled jobs, but 51,000 skilled jobs 
would have been destructed, with the total impact of the measure being 70.000 only.
 Jamet (2005) presents also an analysis at industry level. It shows that the revival of unskilled 
employment  intervenes  especially  in  the  services  and  the  construction,  and  not  in 
manufacturing.  In  fact  it  is  the  services  sector  which  profited  the  most  from  social 
contributions cuts. Its modelling supposes that the skilled workers are in full employment, but 
it takes account of heterogeneities between the sectors and of the fact that the sectors which 
strongly profit from the contributions cuts reductions lower their prices and gain some shares 
of market. The article gives three estimates of the effect of the cut in place in 97 according to 
the elasticity  of  un-skilled employment  to  its  cost.  In  its  higher  estimation (1.2),  the  cut 
increases unskilled employment by 164.000. 
Table 11 compares the result of 15 studies on the effects of employers’ social contributions 
cuts.  Last  column  shows  job  creation  for  10  billion  euro,  which  was  the  amount  of 
contributions’ cuts in 1997 (before the introduction of the 35-hour week) and half of today’s 
measures.  Most of these studies estimate that 300 000 jobs are created for an  ex ante 10 
billion cut in social  contributions.  There are  four exceptions: Laroque-Salanie (2000) and 
Crépon-Desplatz  find much more;  Gafsi-L’Horty-Mihoubi (2004)  and Jamet  (2005)  much 
less. 
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11. Studies on the impact of social contribution cuts
Type of analysis Measure analysed
 Ex  ante/ex  post  
costs  en 
billions*
Impact  on 
employment
Employment
/10 billion
CSREC 
(1997)
Small model with 
calibrated 
parameters
10 billion FF 
according  to 
1997 cut
2.25 48 000/  71 000 265 000
Dares (1997) Small model with 
calibrated 
parameters 
10 billion FF 
according  to 
1997 cut 
2.25 60 000 265 000
Malinvaud 
(1997)
Small model with 
calibrated 
parameters
1997 cut 9  350 000   (  10 
years);  500 000 
(at term)
390 000
Laffargue 
(1996. 2000)
General equilibrium 
model with 
calibrated 
parameters
10  point   of 
contribution 
on low-wage
8.6 /7.3 528 000 613 000
Salanié 
(2000) 
Audric  et  al. 
(2000)
Small model with 
calibrated 
parameters
10  point   of 
contribution 
on low-wage
4.1 /0.7 120 000 290 000
L’Horty 
(2000)
Small model with 
calibrated 
parameters
10  point   of 
contribution 
on low-wage
2.25 70 000 310 000
Laroque-
Salanie 
(2000)
Simulation on 
household data 
1997 cut 2.8 /-3.5 490 000 1 750 000
Crepon-
Desplatz 
(2001)
Microeconometric 
study on firm data 
1997 cut 6.5 /-1.5 460 000 708 000
Lerais (2001) Econometric on 
macro data
1999 cut 8 170 000 212 000
Beffy-
Fourcade 
(2005)
Econometric on 
macro data 
2000 cut 12 330 000 275 000
Doisy  et  al. 
(2004)
General equilibrium 
model with 
calibrated 
parameters 
2000 cut 8 /1.2 320 000 400 000
Hennion-
Loisy (2006)
Econometric on 
macro data 
2003 cut 12 250 000 208 000
Gafsi  et  al. 
(2005)
Econometric on 
sector data 
1999 cut 9 70 000 78 000
Jamet (2005) Econometric on 
sector data 
1997 cut 9.8 164 000 167 000
Guiliani 
(2005)
Small model with 
calibrated 
parameters 
2005 cut 21.4 575 000 268 000
* Estimation in 2006 euros (HS) 
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3.4 The state of the debate
Social security contributions cuts on low wages cost approximately 18 billion euros today, i.e. 
1% of GDP. They are often questioned, especially because their impact on employment is 
difficult to assess. 
An average estimate of about 550,000 jobs created would have an  ex post cost of 9 billion 
euro, i.e. 176,000 euros per created job, which is quite a lot. 
Some, like Cahuc (2003) consider higher numbers of jobs created and recommend to extend 
the measure (up to a 0 rate for employees and employers’ social contributions at the SMIC 
level versus 30 percentage points currently); without extending it beyond 1.6 times SMIC; 
possibly financing it by a rise in contributions on higher wage employees.  But what is the 
social justification for over-taxing some workers and not capital income? Is it necessary to  
widen the low-wage trap? Is it necessary to concentrate all measures on unskilled jobs? 
According to DARES and DGTPE (2006), abolishing existing cuts and rebates would destroy 
800,000 jobs. But this impact is obtained by rule of three based on an evaluation of 300,000 
jobs created in 1997. The gross cost of job creation would be 22,500 euros (i.e. roughly the 
SMIC); the net cost 7,300 euros. 
According to the Cour des comptes report (2006): 
– Social contributions cuts are not very useful in the industrial sector, where priority 
should be to develop high value-added activities rather than protect low wage sectors. 
But  are  we  sure  that  these  high-value  added  sectors  can  create  the  required  
employment level? One can think that it is socially expensive to accept the closing of  
companies in sectors or areas in difficulty, knowing that their workers will remain  
with unemployment until their retirement. 
– They hardly influenced employment policies in hypermarkets albeit allowing them to 
increase their margins. 
– In “hotel-coffee-restaurant” sectors, cuts would have been an incentive for companies 
to create more low-paid jobs without any positive effect on total employment. 
The Cour des Comptes recommends on the one hand policies to increase innovation, on the 
other hand active policies for the unemployed (training programmes). It recommends either to 
reduce the contributions cuts’ threshold to 1.3 down from 1.6 SMIC (gain: 7 billion euros for 
public finances), or to restrict them only to companies with less than 20 salaries (gain: 9.5 
billion euros). Should employment policy take that risk? We do not think so. 
4. The Working Tax Credit (PPE) 
In the early 2000’s, the social and economic debate was focused in France on the high rate of 
unemployment  of unskilled labour (11.8 % in 2002).  The rise of short-term contracts  and 
involuntary part-time jobs generated a strong rise in the number of ‘poor workers’ families. 
There was little financial incentive for unskilled workers, entitled to the minimum income, to 
take a part-time job at the minimum wage level, and even sometimes a full-time job. So these 
workers  could  be  tempted  to  remain  unemployed,  caught  in  an  unemployment  trap.  The 
Socialist  government  headed  by  Prime  minister  Lionel  Jospin  introduced  a  refundable 
working tax credit (Prime pour l’emploi, PPE) in February 2001 with a view to increase the 
living  standards  of  unskilled  workers  and  to  make  their  work  pay.  Its  rules  have  been 
modified by the right-wing governments of Jean-Pierre Raffarin in 2003 and of Dominique 
Villepin in 2006. We will discuss first the appropriateness of the PPE. We will then examine 
how it  works  and how it  modifies  the gain for  work.  Then,  we will  present  and discuss 
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empirical work on the PPE’s impact on employment. Finally, criticisms made about the PPE 
and the possible ways of reform will be discussed.
4.1 In face of unemployed unskilled labour…
French economists are divided into three groups. Some believe that France has a negative 
employment  gap  at  all  skills  levels.  The  high  unemployment  rate  of  unskilled  labour  is 
parallel  with the ‘de-qualification’ of skilled labour. In a situation of high unemployment, 
companies hire over-skilled labour instead of unskilled labour which raises the unemployment 
rate  of  the  latter.  Raising  economic  growth  is  the  only  thing  to  be  done.  Hence,  rapid 
economic growth generated 2 million jobs between 1997 and 2001 (9% of total employment). 
There is no need to introduce specific measures in favour of unskilled employment.
Other economists argue that demand for unskilled jobs is too weak in France: the minimum 
wage (SMIC) is too high for social reasons, while demand for unskilled jobs declines due to 
technological  progress,  capital-labour  trade-off  and  competition  from low-wage  emerging 
countries.  The  best  solution would  be  to  allow everyone  to  be  able  to  take skilled jobs, 
through higher education and vocational training. Since this is long-term process, low-skilled 
labour costs have to be cut through lower social contributions. As we have already seen, this 
strategy has been implemented at a large scale in France since 1993. 
In  1987,  the  Rocard  government  introduced  a  minimum income:  the  ‘Revenu  Minimum 
d’Insertion’ (RMI). The RMI is a differential benefit, which ensures a minimum income to the 
unemployed who are not entitled to unemployment allowances accounting for their family 
situation. In principle, the RMI is entitled only to people who make efforts to be back on 
employment, but this restriction does not apply in practice. As the SMIC aims at ensuring a 
minimum living standard for low-wage workers, the RMI cannot be significantly lower. In 
recent years, firms have offered a growing number of unskilled part-time jobs, which allow 
for greater flexibility of work organisation. Due to the labour market situation, companies 
could easily hire workers who would have otherwise remained unemployed. But a worker 
married and earning 0.5 SMIC has a lower income than the RMI: work does not pay for this 
worker. So a third group of economists consider that this unemployment trap is one of the 
reasons for the high rate of unemployment in France. A majority of RMI earners prefer to 
receive this benefit than search for a job that will provide them a very small marginal income. 
Wage earnings (at the SMIC level, or even at ½ SMIC) must remain significantly higher than 
the RMI to bring unemployed people back to work. It is not only an incentive to work, it is 
also fair: from a social viewpoint, it is desirable that work be always rewarded. Two options 
are then possible:  abolishing the RMI,  but  this  has  never been suggested,  because of the 
serious social issues it would raise in a context of high unemployment; introducing a specific 
subsidy for low skilled jobs. 
However,  the small  gap between the RMI and the SMIC does not  seem to prevent  RMI 
earners from taking a job at the SMIC level. The huge success of SMIC paid part-time jobs 
(saleswomen or cashiers) illustrates that the problem is on the demand side and not on labour 
supply. A large majority of unskilled unemployed do not succeed to find a job and it is not 
their first choice to live on the RMI. Workers prefer to have a low-paid job, giving them a 
social status and entitlement to old-age pension, to be ‘socially inserted’ in the society and to 
have career prospects rather than stay on benefits. There are of course exceptions, but in a 
context of high unemployment, these exceptions do not have an impact on total employment. 
Who cares if Paul does not want to take the job Jeanne will be happy to take? From 1997 to 
2001,  when there  was rapid  growth  in  France there were  labour  shortages  only for  very 
specific skilled jobs but not for SMIC workers. If the French economy suffers from skilled 
labour shortages, trying to bring back to work unskilled workers will not help.
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4.2 The PPE rules: a history 
In 1998 a first measure aiming at making work pay on a transitory basis was introduced: the 
RMI incentive (the intéressement). This system entitled a RMI earner to continue to benefit 
from part of the RMI in the first year after starting a job, as only half of wage earnings were 
taken into account for the calculation of the RMI. Let us consider the example of a couple 
with two children. If they do not work, they get the RMI: 767 euros; a job paid at 0.5 SMIC 
(621 euros) will not pay. Owing to the incentive system, they will still benefit from a RMI of 
399 euros; the job will increase their income by 250 euros. This measure makes a part-time 
job always pay more than staying on the RMI and slightly raises the gains of taking a full-
time job. But it plays on a temporarily basis only: after one year, no RMI is paid anymore, the 
family income falls; it is then necessary to be back fully on the RMI to be entitled to the 
incentive later again. The system is not satisfactory.
In 2001, the Jospin government introduced several measures in order to make work pay more. 
Housing allowances, dwellings taxation, income taxation were modified to allow low-wage 
workers to be entitled to benefits previously entitled to RMI earners only. The PPE was then 
introduced. It is a refundable tax credit paid to low-wage workers.  The PPE is calculated on 
the basis of the wages of year t, but paid in October of year t+1 (when taxpayers pay their 
income taxes). The legislation of the PPE is very complex.
In 2004, a full-time worker paid at the SMIC (11689 euros per year) was entitled to a tax 
credit of 4.6% of its wages, i.e. a maximum of 538 euros. The PPE is cut by 11% of the part 
of the wage above 11689 euros. The PPE therefore equals 0 at a wage level of 16364 euros, 
i.e. 1.4 SMIC. For part-time jobs, the PPE is calculated on the basis of a full-time equivalent. 
The wage is first considered on a full-time basis which serves of a basis for calculating the 
PPE that will then be paid in proportion of time worked. Following the 2003 reform, the 
amount of the PPE has been increased by 45% for part-time workers (see Chart 2). The credit 
is not paid for a working time of less than 30% of the full time. 
The PPE is  calculated per  individual.  However,  a  ceiling applies  on family incomes:  2.6 
SMIC for a couple, 3.3 SMIC for a family with two children. It mainly affects women earning 
low wages with their husband earning a relatively high wage. In terms of incentives, there is 
no reason for paying a tax credit to the 2nd worker in a couple, since he/she is not in an activity 
trap (see Table 13).
There are also family elements, but their amounts are small and arbitrary: 82 euros a year for 
a non-working spouse, 36 euros per child, 72 euros for the first child of a single person. This 
is because the constitutional council (Conseil constitutionnel) requires that all direct  taxes 
take account of the family situation. But this requirement has been fulfilled on a minimum 
basis. 
The PPE rates increased from 2.2 % of wages in 2000 to 7.7% in 2006 for full-time workers 
paid at the SMIC; it increased from 2.2% to 12.2% for half-time workers as the SMIC level 
(see Table 12). Since 2003, the bonus for part-time has increased to encourage inactive people 
to take part-time jobs.
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Chart 2: PPE’s allowance (in euros, per year, in 2005, 2004 income.)
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12. Evolution of PPE rates
Wages in … SMIC level 0.5 SMIC level
2000 2.2%  (announced) 
; 4.4% in fact
2.2%  (announced); 
4.4% in fact 
2001 4.4% 4.4%
2002 4.4% 4.4%
2003 4.6% 6.7%
2004 4.6% 6.7%
2005 6.0% 9.8%
2006 7.7% 12.2%
Table 13 shows the monthly gains resulting from taking a job in 2005. Due to the complexity 
of  the  system,  especially  because  RMI’s  rules  are  not  consistent  with  those  of  family 
allowances, these monthly gains vary significantly from one case to another. The gains are 
always very limited for the 1st worker of the family, weak for a single and significant for the 
2nd worker of the family. Due to its low value, the PPE does not alter this situation much. 
Leaving the RMI for a SMIC paid job does not really pay for the 1st worker of the family. A 
job paid at 0.5 SMIC will not really pay for the 1st worker of the family; it will slightly pay for 
a single. The job (half-time or full time) will always pay for the 2nd worker of the family. The 
PPE helps leaving inactivity for a full-time job, but not for part-time jobs. It also benefits 
people who have no real incentive, like couples earning 2 SMIC.
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13. Gains from taking a work in 2005 (in euros, per month)
From RMI  to ½ SMIC From RMI  to SMIC
Before PPE With PPE With Int. Before PPE With PPE With Int.
Single, 0 child 72 103 281 409 446 446
Single, 1 child 51 87 289 422 464 464
Single, 2 children 143 183 293 520 566 566
Couple, 0 child;  NW 0 38 291 266 310 549
Couple ,1 child;  NW 0 41 294 224 271 554
Couple, 2 children;  NW 0 44 297 234 284 556
Couple, 3 children; NW 0 42 316 387 439 557
Couple, 0 child;  SMIC 364 388 149 806 836 597
Couple, 1 child; SMIC 320 344 61 731 761 478
Couple, 2 children;  SMIC 339 363 92 679 709 438
Couple, 3 children;  SMIC 369 389 272 727 757 639
Note: In bold, the cases where taking a half-time job entails a gain of less than 200 euros and the cases where taking a full-
time job entails a gain of less than 400 euros. NW:  non worker spouse; SMIC: the spouse already works and earn the SMIC; 
Int : with intéressement or with the ACR.
In 2005, PPE has an annual cost of 2.5 billon euros and benefited 9.4 million households, 
mainly at 2nd, 3rd and 4th income deciles. For 2007, the cost is estimated to reach 3.7 billion 
euros. The first decile, which includes the unemployed, does not benefit much of the system. 
The PPE does not account for the distributional principle of taxation, since the tax credit 
increase for wages ranging from 0.3 to 1 SMIC. There is no justification for that in a period of 
high unemployment where being unemployed is not a deliberate choice. Why should a tax 
credit increase income disparities between unskilled workers who have a full-time job and 
those who have no choice but take a part-time job, or those who do not find a job? Let us 
consider Peter and Paul who both have a SMIC paid job. Paul is fired and does not find a new 
job. Is this a reason for giving a tax credit to Peter who has been lucky to keep his job? 
Besides, as the PPE focuses on the gap between the RMI and the SMIC, the government does 
not wish to raise the RMI. More precisely, it does not want the RMI to increase in line with 
the SMIC but to stay indexed on consumer prices.
The small amounts of PPE’s elements for children are not a good substitute for the needed 
reform of family allowances, which are weak in France, especially for families with one or 
two children.  They should  be  raised  and a  Family  Supplement  for  poor  income families 
should be introduced (the Family Supplement currently benefits only poor families with at 
least three children).
The PPE is not a strong incentive. It is paid on an annual basis while wages are paid on a 
monthly basis: someone finding a job in January 2005 will receive the tax credit in October 
2006  only.  Calculating  its  amount  is  very  complicate.  The  PPE  adds  to  the  existing 
complexity of the French tax system. It does not improve the difficult situation of workers 
who evolve between RMI and ‘small jobs’, with incomes being affected for unclear reasons 
by the fluctuation of the incentive RMI and of the housing benefits.  More important, the 
allowance is small in comparison with foreign similar tax credits: a couple with two children 
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will receive a maximum of 1132 euros per year, while they could receive up to 4200 dollars in 
the US and 6240 pounds in the UK (i.e. 10000 euros). 
However, even if the PPE does not have important incentive effects, one may consider that it 
has satisfactory redistributive effects  since  it  makes  it  possible  to  improve somewhat  the 
situation  of  ‘poor  workers’,  although in  this  case  it  should  better  account  for  the  family 
situation.
4.3 The PPE’s impact on employment
Assessing the impact of PPE on employment requires using models explaining households’ 
labour supply. Such models are particularly difficult to build because of the complexity of the 
French tax and benefit system and of the labour market situation. 
In the French system, most taxes and benefits are calculated on a family basis. So activity 
decisions of the two members of the couple must be modelled simultaneously. Many works 
avoid this difficulty in studying only women participation, men being supposed not to modify 
their labour supply. 
The models have many difficulties in predicting individual behaviours.  The way they are 
build  means  they  will  necessarily  explain  labour  market  participation  by  variables  of 
employment gains without taking account of the labour market situation. From 1997 to 2002, 
the employment rate of women aged 25 to 55 rose from 67.4 to 71.6%: is this because it paid 
more for women to work and leave their “inactivity trap” or because more jobs were offered 
by companies in a period of rapid growth? 
Most models assume that workers choose freely their working time. In fact, around 30% of 
women who work part-time would like to work full-time. In general, the models explain very 
badly part-time work. 
It is necessary to evaluate the income of households with only one adult working. But this is 
extremely difficult. These households may be entitled to several assistance benefits, some of 
which provided by local authorities and therefore difficult to measure (see Anne and L’Horty, 
2000).  Some households are  entitled to  unemployment  benefits,  but  these are  difficult  to 
measure and to take into account (since they are temporary). Last, the PPE is added to the 
“intéressement” of the RMI, already assumed to be a work incentive. None of these models 
account for the “intéressement” which may lead to overestimate the importance of inactivity 
traps because “intéressement” increases work incomes as compared to those of inactivity.
The PPE increases the marginal gain to work for workers at the SMIC level, but the income 
effect plays in the opposite direction. The work incentive may be reduced in some cases for 
married women,  if  their  decision to  take a  job will  mean their  husband will  be no more 
entitled to the PPE. 
To our knowledge (see Stancanelli and Sterdyniak, 2004), four studies have provided an ex 
ante estimate of the PPE’s impact on labour supply and only two studies ex post estimates. No 
exhaustive study has been released despite the expansion of the PPE in the last two years 
because of the complexity of the topic: how to account for all potential workers, describe 
working time choices and accounting for involuntary unemployment and involuntary part-
time…
a) The analysis made with the model INES (Fugazza and al., 2003) deals exclusively 
with women labour supply, either in couple, or alone. In the model, women can choose their 
working time (10, 20, 30 or 39 hours per week). The model does not describe involuntary part 
time.  Part  time  work,  discouraged  activity  and  involuntary  unemployment  are  poorly 
explained. The authors study the impact of the PPE in 2003. According to their estimates (see 
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Table 14), the effect on women activity would be positive but weak (+ 0.25%). Employment 
would increase by 17,000 at an ex post cost of 416 million euros. 
14. PPE’s impact in 2003
Women in couple Alone women.
Impact on employment 0.26% 0.20%
Women increasing their working time 
Women reducing  their working time 
0.03 %
-0.04%
0.04%
0.0
Impact on hours worked 0.26% 0.22%
Source : Fugazza and al., 2003.
b) Choné (2002) models a joint decision of the two members of the couples, supposed to 
choose between participation of the two, of the husband only, of the wife only, or of none of 
them.  Like  Laroque  and  Salanié  (2000b),  the  author  classifies  the  inactive  as  classical 
unemployed or voluntary unemployed or other non-employed. However, part-time workers 
are left out of the sample and individuals are assumed to have the choice only between full-
time  employment  and  inactivity.  This  weakens  the  relevance  of  the  model  in  terms  of 
assessing the impact of the PPE. Choné (2002) finds that the PPE (in the 2003 version) has a 
positive but small impact: it would raise the female employment rate from 47.3 to 47.5% and 
male employment rate from 84.6 to 84.9%. This would mean a 0.4% rise in employment at an 
ex post cost of 0.87 billion euros. 
c) Laroque and Salanié (2002) consider the case of women, single or in couple, aged 25 
to  49.  The  modelling  of  part  time  is  particularly  detailed.  First,  the  authors  make  the 
assumption that the constraint of the SMIC is softened for part-time jobs (firms being able to 
hire workers at  the SMIC level and to make them work longer than the official  and paid 
hours):  this allows some workers with a productivity below the SMIC to find a job (because 
the authors believe that wages equal labour productivity). Second, in order to account for the 
fact that part time is often involuntary, the authors consider the possibility that part-time work 
can be taken by women who would have preferred to work full time. The probability of taking 
a part-time job as a second choice instead of a full time job is very high for non-graduate 
women and very low for graduate women. 
The  authors  compare  2  measures:  the  PPE  (2003  version)  and  the  ACR  (Allocation 
compensatrice de revenue), a benefit which would guarantee any Rmiste who find a job to see 
a rise in its disposable income of at least 60% of its wage earnings). The two measures have 
different ex ante costs: 2.6 billion euros for the ACR, 1.2 billion for the PPE. The ACR has 
strong negative impact on full-time work and increases non-employment. It is an incentive for 
single women, or married women with a husband who does not have a job, to take a job. But 
these women are less numerous that married women with a husband having a job and who are 
have an incentive to work less. The PPE-2003 has a positive but small impact on employment 
(+ 0.3% in full time equivalent). 
15. Effect of employment incentives measures 
In thousands Effectif ACR PPE 2003
Unemployment 2 297 22 – 9
Part time 494 18 5
Full time 2 238 – 40 5
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Source : Laroque and Salanié,  2002.
d)  Bargain (2004) uses the SYSIFF 98 micro-simulation model.  It  studies the case of 
women living in  couple only.  Men labour  supply is  assumed to  be constant.  Women can 
choose between non-activity, part time or full time. Women declaring to be unemployed but 
looking for a job are left out of the sample, so that the author can consider that non-activity is 
always a choice in the sample. 
Part time is taken into account by assuming that some women face a specific cost to find a 
full-time job, but this formalisation is artificial. The model is far from precise, in particular for 
part time: in 100 women working part time, 35 should be inactive according to the model, 13 
part time, 52 full time. For 100 non-participating women, 38 should work full time, 12 part 
time. 
The article analyses the effects of the PPE 2003, the ACR and the reform of the housing 
benefit of 2001. On the studied sample, the first two measures would cost 0.32 billion euros; 
the third one 0.4 billion. On the whole, the PPE 2003 would have a very weak effect on 
employment and especially on full-time employment (see Table 16). On the contrary, the ACR 
would have a little work incentive and would encourage some women to leave their job. The 
reform housing benefits would have had the same effect. In full time equivalent, the PPE 2003 
would increase women in couple participation by 0.6% whereas the ACR would induce a fall 
by 1.9% and housing-benefit reforms would have induced a fall in 0.8%. 
These results do not take account of single women; who will have the weakest gain to take a 
job and for whom the ACR is  a priori the most effective measure (see Table 16).  In the 
sample, only 1.7% of women do not work when their husband does not work, and are thus 
potentially in the “inactivity trap”, which is the case where the ACR is the most appropriate 
measure. The same problem arises for the reform of housing-benefit.
16. Women participation rates 
In %
Initial 
situation
PPE 2003 ACR
Housing
benefit
Non-employed 31.8 31.4 33.1 32.3
Part time 11.3 11.4 11.1 11.4
Full time 56.9 57.2 55.8 56.3
Source : Bargain, 2004.
e) Stancanelli (2004) does the first ex post analysis of the PPE. The analysis applies only 
to women in 2002. The paper uses the method of “difference-in-differences”,  considering 
women who can be entitled to the PPE, and as control groups: women who are not entitled to 
it, either because their wages are a little too high, or because their husband earns a too high 
income.  The  only  significant  result  is  that  the  PPE  would  have  reduced  employment  of 
married women by 0.5 to 1.3% (i.e. by 20,000 to 50,000). No favourable effect appears on 
single women.
f)  The  study  by  Arnaud  and  al. (2005) uses  a  similar  method,  but  on  the  whole 
population. It proposes also an alternative method which integrates information on the fact 
that the individual receives the PPE. The PPE would have a small positive effect on activity, 
hardly significant. The number of additional jobs would be 65,000 at best. Unfortunately, the 
study has not been updated since the PPE has increased. 
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17. Evolution of participation rates
2001/2000 Traitement Group Control Group Difference in differences
ex ante Data + 1.77 % + 0.93 % + 0.84 % (0.43)
ex post Data + 1.68 % + 1.21 % + 0.47 % (0.53)
According to these studies, none of the existing measures would have a significant effect on 
female labour supply. Should it be concluded from it that there is not inactivity trap? Or, on 
the contrary, that the trap is very deep? 
4.4 The debate about the PPE
The PPE is too complex and not a real incentive to work. Some economists have suggested 
focusing the PPE primarily on low earnings, by giving the same allowance to half-time and 
full-time  jobs  and  lowering  the  ceiling  on  the  household’s  total  income.  But  this  would 
increase some of the unsatisfactory impacts of the PPE: incentive to take a part-time job and 
disincentive to take a job for married women. 
The simplest way to reform the PPE would be turn the PPE into a low-wage subsidy, which 
would rely only on the hourly wage, being maximal at the SMIC level and become equal to 0 
for a 1.4 SMIC hourly wage. The PPE could then be paid monthly together with wages. The 
PPE  would  be  only  an  incentive  to  bring  back  to  work  unskilled  people  without  any 
distributional goals. It would benefit spouses at low hourly wages, without considering the 
husband earnings. However, such an option suffers from three limits. An allowance on the 
wage  bill  could  exert  downward  pressures  on  wages.  The  allowance  would  not  be  a 
significant incentive to take a part-time job. Last, the allowance would be similar with the 
existing employers’ contributions rebates: a subsidy for unskilled labour of 6% is equivalent 
to  a  6%  rise  in  the  SMIC  decided  simultaneously  with  a  6%  rise  in  the  employers’ 
contributions rebate.
Another suggested reform would be to make the ‘intéressement’ permanent, as an income 
allowance (IA3). This allowance would be based on the household’s total income, such as: 
IA = RMI – 50% * WE – OI, where IA is the allowance, RMI is the allowance paid to a 
family without resources, WE the wage earnings and OI the other incomes. Hence, a worker 
would always retain 50% of his wages. The IA could be paid monthly by the administration 
services paying family allowances. These services would keep aware of the situation of low-
wage families (as they already do for the RMI and for housing benefits). The gain from taking 
work would always be significant, even for part-time jobs (see table). This allowance would 
raise the poor working families’ incomes. It would have two drawbacks: making part-time 
jobs acceptable and hence favouring their development. It could also have a negative impact 
on spouses’ work in low-skilled couples. The choice is not an easy one.
A tentative conclusion
Measures focusing on employers’ social contributions rebates as well as on allowances for 
unskilled  workers  allow  for  disconnecting  unskilled  labour  costs  for  firms  (SMIC  less 
contributions rebates) and workers’ incomes (SMIC plus the PPE). Low paid workers get a 
subsidy to work; their employers get a subsidy to hire them. Firms get a strong incentive to 
create  such  jobs.  There  is  a  risk  of  creating  a  new  type  of  low  paid  workers  with  no 
3 Named : Allocation Compensatrice de Revenu (ACR) or Revenu de solidarité active (RSA)
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expectations for pay rises since raising their wages will be very costly for the employer and 
not very profitable for  the worker : ‘a low wage trap’.
A French employee, single and at paid at the SMIC level:
– costs his company  (for a 35-hour working week) 1 477 euros, 
– pays 440 euros in unemployment and pensions contributions,  representing differed 
wages; 
– receives a net transfer of 110 euros (PPE + housing allowance - CSG – Income tax - 
health and family contributions), and so has 1127 euros of disposable income, 
– So there is  no net  fiscal  and social  burden for  workers at  the SMIC level;  health 
insurance is  free for them. Their  living standard is  disconnected from their  labour 
costs.
But contribution cuts, in theory refunded by the State, weaken the financing of the Social 
security. Companies are given an incentive to create specific unskilled jobs, without prospects 
in terms of career, trapped in low wages, since rising wages is very costly for the employer 
and not very rewarding for the employee: a 10% rise in wages for a SMIC worker (+125 
euros) costs the company 271 euros and provides 22 euros to the employee. 
Jobs created do not match the rising education level of the young. So one day this set of 
measures will need to be changed.
Part-time work incentives lead companies to have more and more part-time unskilled jobs. 
This  provides  greater  flexibility  to  companies.  But  unskilled workers  (women in  80% of 
cases) cannot find full-time jobs any more. They have to live with one or two part-time jobs, 
flexible  hours,  without  any career  prospect.  Families  with  one  or  two unskilled workers, 
working part-time become ‘poor worker’ families and this category is rising in France.
The work incentive strategy is based on maintaining a significant gap between the RMI and 
the SMIC. There is a risk is that this gap is obtained through downward pressure on the RMI 
level. In the last 13 years, the RMI was increased by 4.5% in terms of purchasing power, 
losing between 10 and 23% relative to the SMIC for 35 or 39 hour working weeks. 
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